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Abstract  
The formation of shareholders or board of directors’ structure is considered as one of important issues of 
corporate governance that impacts the motivation of managers. We shall consider that the impact of board of 
directors’ ownership structure on the performance and productivity of corporate is a multidimensional and 
complicated issue. For this reason, we can expect all kinds of conflicts and contradictions of interests among 
people and groups, including conflict of interest among owners and managers, shareholders and creditors, real 
and legal shareholders, internal and external shareholders and…In this regard, there are extensive researches 
about the impact of board of directors’ ownership and managers on the performance ad the value of a company 
within different countries and researchers have achieved different results and conflicts. Regarding many 
researches in this field, this research by using descriptive-analytical method has studied the impact of board of 
directors’ structure and features on the performance of corporate within companies listed in Tehran stock 
exchange. The results indicate that there is a positive and significant relation among CEO duality and company’s 
performance, also here is no any significant relation between board of directors’ adherence and company’s 
performance.  
Keywords: board of directors, company’s performance, shareholder ownership  
1. Introduction 
One of the axes of recent changes within the issues of company governance system is the impact of sarbynz 
Oxley Act in bolding the supervisory role of internal mechanisms. Sharp division of executive management 
duties from board of directors’ management, bolding the supervisory role of non-executive management and 
determining their responsibilities area and the necessity of having the knowledge of accounting and financial as 
one of the job authentication conditions about at least one person of non-executive managers and informing other 
members from accounting and financial issues, are some of recent changes. Moreover, the role of board of 
directors’ committees (including non-executive managers) about internal controls, relation with internal and 
independent auditors and … has become very important and it is completely divided from the duties of executive 
managers. In Iran, approved business law in 03 May 1932, forms the principle and law framework of existing 
business. Regarding to its references antiquity, which were highly incomplete, the law has changed some parts of 
business law including 300 articles after 15 March 1969 approval replacing articles 21 to 94of business law 
approved in 1311. It seems the mentioned amendment has not changed the initial basis of business law 
significantly. Also, within the previous law and the amendment, the duties of board of directors and their duties 
division are not significantly considered (Sotudeh Tehrani, 2003).  
The formation of shareholders or board of directors structure are considered as the hot topics of company’s 
governance that impacts the motivation of managers, therefore, it can influence the efficiency of any company. 
In past, economists assume that all the groups relating to a corporation are working for a mutual goal but during 
recent three decades, many interest conflict cases have been presented among groups and the way that companies 
are facing with such conflicts by economists. 
1.1 Necessity of Research 
The new aspects of this research can be reviewed in three ways: first, few researches have been done in Iran 
about the features of board of directors until now; this research is new in the respect. Second, the model for 
indicating the impact of board of director's structure and features on the performance of company is utilized for 
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the first time in Iran through this research, it makes this research new as well. Third, this is the first research that 
is reviewing the structure and the features of board of directors at the same time. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The main purpose of this research is to study the impact of board of directors’ structure and features on the 
performance of company within listed companies in Tehran stock exchange and its secondary purposes are: 
1) Review of the relation among CEO duality and company’s performance and the relation among board of 
directors’ adherence and company’s performance within listed companies in Tehran stock exchange. 
2) Identifying the impact of board of directors’ structure and features on company’s performance within the 
groups of different industries in Tehran stock exchange and their method of investment in stock market 
1.3 Research Questions 
1- Is there any significant relation between CEO duality and company’s performance? 
2- Is there any significant relation between CEO adherence and company’s performance? 
1.4 Ownership (Centralization, Composition and Structure) 
The centralization of ownership means the major amount of company’s shares are belonging to major 
shareholders of the company and it indicates what percentage of company’s shares are in hand of limited number 
of people. Mahdavi and Meidary (2005) believe that the comparison of concentrated ownership indexes in Iran 
market with five countries of US, Japan, Germany, China and Czech indicate that the Iran stock market has 
highly concentrated ownership structure. In addition, Iran similar to Czech, more ownership concentration is 
more efficient. In other words, minimizing ownership is impacting on efficiency in a negative way. 
Ownership structure of a company is significant in different dimensions and it is initially defined based upon two 
variables including internal shareholders or the shares in hand of internal shareholders and external shareholders. 
We shall consider that the impact of board of directors’ ownership structure on the performance and companies’ 
productivity is a complicated and multidimensional issue. For this reason, we can expect all kinds of interest 
conflicts among people and groups, including conflict on interests among owners and managers, shareholders 
and creditors, real and legal shareholders, internal and external shareholders, and … . 
1.5 Composition of the Board of Directors and Shareholders Ownership 
Many different researches have been done about the impact of board of directors’ ownership and managers on 
the performance and value of a company, and researchers have achieved different results. Among the theories 
presented based on experts’ findings through their researches, the hypotheses of Convergence of interests and 
management position stability are more significant: 
Interests convergence hypothesis: based on such hypothesis, by increasing the size of company, the ownership of 
company’s stock becomes more broader and more dispersed, as a result, the share of managers’ ownership will 
decrease. Therefore, the interests of managers will not be matched with the shareholders’ demands completely 
and it may cause that the decisions of managers to become more based on managers’ interests rather than 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth. It is expected to decrease the conflicts in interests and to increase the 
productivity and value of company and practically there will establish a stronger convergence among the 
interests of managers and shareholders (Na, 2002). 
Managers’ position consolidation hypothesis: this hypothesis is presented by Demsetz in 1983, believes that 
dispersion and lack of concentration of company’s stock ownership and decrease of managers’ share from 
ownership cannot be a firm reason for demotivating managers in maximizing the value of company and their 
weak performance and the increase of managers’ ownership causes the impacts decrease of external supervision, 
more consolidation of managers’ position and lack of their consideration toward discipline and investment 
market regulations and this issue will provide negative impacts for the value of the company (Na, 2002). 
In comparison between two above hypotheses we can say that interests’ convergence is having more powerful 
theoretical basis since appropriate and acceptable performance of managers by shareholders, regardless to the 
manager’s ownership percentage, can provide consolidation of his position, also, weak performance of manager, 
even by having high percentage of ownership, may shake the position of manager. The hypothesis of interests’ 
convergence considers the positive relation among two phenomena of managers’ ownership and company’s 
performance but the hypothesis of managers’ position consolidation is considering the market status and 
assessing potential investors from the impacts of managers’ ownership (same, 2002).  
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1.6 Composition of the Board of Directors and Institutional and Major Investor's Ownership 
The existence of major shareholders in formation of ownership can provide positive and negative consequences 
for company. In accordance with some of experts, the existence of major shareholders in company reinforces 
motivations on supervising the managers’ performance in one hand and sometimes due to lack of matching 
interests and goals of major shareholders with the interests and expectations of minor shareholders, the costs of 
control and directing major shareholders’’ interests with other shareholders’’ interests will be increased (Wang & 
Xiao, 2006). Totally, different ideas have been presented about the kind of relation and impact of institutional 
and major shareholders’ ownership on the performance and value of company as below: 
- Efficient supervision hypothesis: based on such hypothesis, institutional and major shareholders that are out 
of company, in comparison with minor shareholders, due to having facilities, high experience can supervise the 
managers with lower cost. Therefore, we can expect a positive relation between institutional ownership and 
company’s performance.  
- Strategic alignment hypothesis: based on this hypothesis, sometimes the expectations of institutional 
shareholders may become engaged with the managers; interests and due to the matching of both groups’ interests, 
the interests of minor shareholders will be neglected. In such case, expected positive impacts from the effective 
supervision by major shareholders on managers will decrease and in this mode we will observe a conflict of 
interests among major shareholders and other owners that due to the influential power of major shareholders, 
such conflict will be against the interests of other shareholders ultimately,  
- Saving acquisition hypothesis: this hypothesis which is discussed in framework of merge and acquisition of 
companies is firstly considers purchase and owning the stock of weak internal companies of a country by 
external shareholders; the phenomenon which is popped following with the Asian financial crisis of 1997 within 
the financial markets of developing countries (a, 2002). 
1.7 Composition of the Board of Directors and Foreign Shareholders’ Ownership 
According to some of experts, due to different reasons, the presence of external shareholders in formation of 
ownership can provide performance improvement and productivity increase and company’s value as below: 
- Supervision over managers; 
- Increasing expertise and experience of company management; 
-entry of new capitals and increasing flexibility and financial capacity of the company 
Facilitation and speeding up linking companies to global capital markets and decrease of capital cost rate 
(Campbell, 2002).The results of research by Aydin, N. Sayim, M. and A. Yalama in Turkish companies that are 
having external ownership indicate that external ownership companies, in terms of their capital return, are 
working better than companies having internal ownership. The evidences of this research support the hypothesis 
that cooperation with external ownership improves company’s performance.  
1.8 Composition of the Board of Directors Ownership and Free Float 
Free floating share is a percentage of company’s total capital that is in access for deal in stock market. Morgan 
Stanley institution has defined free floating stock as below: 
“A ratio of a company’s stock that is tradable within market and it is not kept through strategic shareholders for 
managerial purposes.” 
Strategic shareholders are those who investing with managerial purposes and for a long-term within the stock of 
companies and their stock is not considered as free floating stock, non-strategic shareholders are those who their 
main goal is to buy and sell stock to achieve profit and they are not having managerial purposes for buying stock. 
We can say that the shares that are not belonging to strategic shareholders is considered as free floating stock. 
The purpose of necessity to consider the least amount of free floating stock is the efficiency of market 
performances. In fact, the stocks of countries which are having less free floating stock is less deep and they are 
highly fragile. In order to develop the width of market we shall avoid company’s concentration and a specific 
industry and the depth of market is achieved when the price balance of the market remain the same by 
distributing and trading mass stock which is one of the reasons of small market shallowness and few number of 
actors and low amount of free floating stock. 
Investors’ formation is effective on liquidity of shares. Lack of diversity among investors causes them not to be 
able to allocate situations within trades. The factor that is directly impacting on the liquidity of shares is “free 
floating stock”. Since few amount of free floating stock causes liquidity decrease and increase of the liquidity 
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risk of stock, therefore, it causes increase of expected return rate of shareholders, such expectation is existing 
that companies with less free floating stock, are more productive.  
1.9 The Relationship between Ownership Board of Directors Composition with Market Liquidity 
Liquidity means the ability to buy or sell an asset with low cost and without significant impact on its price. 
Liquidity of stock exchange within capital market is one the most effective factors on proper performance of 
market.  
The level of company’s internal shareholders ownership is effective on the liquidity of company’s stock. When 
individuals inside the company including managers and employees are the owners of the stock, their deals will 
be done before abnormal changes in price of company’s stock (Seyhun, 1986). Institutional investors are playing 
significant role in supervision, and usually there is a relation between institutional ownership and stock liquidity 
of a company (Wahal, 1996). Also, due to the impact of exchange operations of stock by institutional investors 
on stock price, probably the stock liquidity increases significantly (Vishny, 1992). 
Ownership structure is in connection with difference of recommended prices for buy and sale. Sarin and others 
in their research have found out, in case that a part of company’s stock is owned by the individuals inside the 
company, such difference will increase. This issue is significant due to the relation among ownership structure 
and information asymmetry. The positive relation among shareholders inside company or the same owners of 
final information and information asymmetry is related to different factors. In case that high percentage of 
shareholding of final information owners is accompanied with higher probability of deals from them, the 
expected loss of analyst in terms of informed dealers due to predicting more distance among recommended 
prices for buy and sale will be compensated. Although higher institutional ownership is in connection with the 
distance of buy and sale recommended prices but there is no any clear relation between institutional ownership 
and information asymmetry.  
1.10 Samples of Legal and Experimentall Aspects of Shareholding Composition 
In this part, the main features of ownership structures of big companies within different countries during 1980 to 
1995 in terms of legal status and experimental will be studied.  
 
Table 1. Summary and classification of legal and experimental aspects of samples of shareholding composition 
rules country Situation 
A: Laws on Foreign 
Ownership 
Developing 
countries 
Legal Status: foreign ownership often is prohibited. Of course, this situation is changing rapidly 
and the majority of developing countries are forwarding to open their capital market for 
foreigners. 
Current situation: foreign ownership in most developing countries is very rare. 
Germany 
Legal status: Currently almost  there is no restrictions foreigners ownership in German 
companies. 
Current situation: a significant number of companies fully or partially owned by foreign 
investors. 
Japan 
Legal Status: there were limitations on foreign ownership till recently 
Current situation: foreign ownership is rare. 
American 
countries 
Legal Status: restrictions on foreign ownership of US companies actually have been taken 
Current situation: the growing number of companies fully or partially owned by foreign 
investors 
Denmark 
Legal Status: nowadays restrictions on foreign ownership of Denmark companies have been 
taken 
Current situation: the growing number of companies fully or partially owned by foreign 
investors. 
B: Rules governing on 
Financial Firms and 
Non Financial Firms  
Developing 
countries 
Legal Status: Financial companies are not allowed to own property in non-financial companies 
Current situation: Institutional Investors ownership rarley has been seen in non-financial 
companies 
Germany 
Legal Status: There are very few obstacles. Banks and institutional investors are able to 
ownership of a controlling stake in non-financial companies 
Current situation: A large part of the capital stock is funded by institutional investors for causal 
that these investors have Long–term Commitment before company. The degree of ownership 
concentration is generally very high.  
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Japan 
Legal Status: 
Financial Investors officially are not allowed to the ownership of non financial companies. In 
particular, several institutional investors form consortium to control several companies and the 
task of monitoring in each consortium to be awarded an investor in case of negligence in 
supervision, and unofficially, they are responsible for losses incurred on other investors. 
Current situation: The majority of the shares are  in public companies and other financial 
investors 
American 
countries 
Legal Status: There are many obstacles. Therefore banks and institutional investors are not 
allowed to the possession of non-financial companies. However recently for the temporary 
cases with the aim of restructuring financial structures the permission is possible. 
Current situation: primarily, stock the majority of public companies is provided from the 
financial investment resources. 
Denmark 
Legal Status: Banks and institutional investors are not allowed to the possession of a controlling 
stake in non-financial companies 
Current situation: currently , institutional investors and banks provide more than 30% of the 
financing large corporations on stock markets 
C) Government 
ownership rules 
American 
countries 
Legal Status: The most important industries are exclusively owned by the state. In most 
developing countries, Large–scale Privatization gradually takes priority 
Current situation: Approximately, the state ownership is the dominant form of the ownership. 
American 
countries 
Legal Status: There are some prohibition in important economic areas of government ownership
Current situation: Railway and the majority of postal services are still state-owned. Also health 
care sector, education, nursing home and public services are seen in the state ownership 
American 
countries 
Legal Status: There are some prohibition in important economic areas of government ownership
Current situation: Railway and the majority of postal services are still state-owned. Also health 
care sector, education, nursing home and public services are seen in the state ownership 
American 
countries 
Legal Status: Very limited part of the economy is considered for government ownership 
Current situation: The most areas of the economy is in the hands of private sector. 
Denmark 
Legal Status: The state ownership is prohibited in an important areas of the economy, 
Current situation: Railway and the majority of postal services are still state-owned. 
D) rules related to other 
types of property 
American 
countries 
Legal Status: Family and public Ownership is possible.  
Current situation: Concentrated Family Ownership and government ownership provide the 
dominant form and Public Equity Markets are very small 
American 
countries 
Legal Status: There are very few obstacles. 
Current situation: public markets of shares are small. The degree of concentration of the 
ownership is generally very high. 
American 
countries 
Legal Status: There are very few obstacles. 
Current situation: The public stock markets are extensive and the majority of shares held by 
shareholders who have some degree of long-term commitment to the company. This includes 
institutional investors, as well as major suppliers and customers. 
American 
countries 
Legal Status: There are very few obstacles. 
Current situation: Family ownership is not common among large companies. Stock markets are 
extensive and ownership is very fragmented. So that the majority of the stocks is in the hands of 
investors that are not closely associated with the company. 
Denmark 
Legal Status: There are very few obstacles. 
Current situation: The degree of concentration of the ownership is very high in general and 
public stock markets have gradually become more important than causal stock markets. 
Family-owned enterprises are still very important in terms of share ownership. 
 
By reviewing above table, we can summarize the hints that are observed among developed countries below: 
- There is no any limitation in connection with the ownership of foreigners legally. 
- About the ownership of financial companies within non-financial companies, it is observed much difference 
among countries in terms of law; 
- About government share in ownership of enterprises, there is limitation for government ownership on 
important and main economic sections in all countries except for the sections of economy that are more about 
welfare-social and developmental aspects.  
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- About other types of ownership, same condition is observed in terms of law and there are very few 
obstacles in all these countries but the current status indicates the existence of significant difference among 
countries and we see differences among countries based on the degree of their scope and extent of general stock 
market, ownership concentration, and the level of family and institutional ownership popularity.  
In return, dominant situation on developing countries during the studied period was different. General features of 
this group of countries we can mention the dimension of laws and regulations for forbidding or serious limitation 
of foreigner ownership but it is decreasing, relational limitations of ownership of financial institutions within 
non-financial companies, widespread government monopolies, but it is decreasing, privatization and legalizing 
family ownerships. Current status of such countries is also indicating rare foreigner ownership, low share of 
institutional investors’ ownership within non-financial companies, governmental ownership dominance, and 
concentrated family ownerships and having small stock market.  
2. Review of Literature  
- Hanokobatholla (2008) has studied the relation of board of directors’ features and the performance of listed 
companies in Newziland stock exchange by using the information of 207 companies during 2004 to 2007 which 
their financial statement was in access. The findings of such research indicate that among different features of 
board of directors, only the return on assets rate and the ratio of ownership are having positive and significant 
relation with company’s performance and also the number of board of directors’ members is having negative and 
significant relation with company’s performance. With all respect for individuals who are having PH.D, in this 
research, there is no any significant relation between such variable with company’s performance. 
- Ebi et al. (2011) have studied the impact of special dominant mechanisms of risk on company’s 
performance. Results indicate that dominant mechanisms are designed specifically for managing risk; they will 
have positive impact on company’s performance during financial crisis. 
- Jasten Mendzak (2013) in a research titled (mutual board of directors, optional reveals and profit quality) 
has concluded that mutual board of directors is having negative relation with voluntary reveals and positive 
relation with the quality of profit and the size of company and the independency of board of directors head is 
having positive relation with voluntary reveals. But mutual boards are not having significant impact on lack of 
pay for tax. 
- Chairmais and Ganni (2014) have studied the impact of board of directors’ structure and features on the 
performance of companies in US. The results of this research indicate that the company is having the capital of 
board of directors in terms of external managers’ ability in order to supervise the managers and consulting 
managers.  
- Namzi Mohammad and Kermani Ehsan (2008) have studied the impact of ownership structure on the 
performance of companies listed in Tehran stock exchange. Findings indicate that there is a significant and 
negative relation between “institutional ownership” and company’s performance and there is a significant and 
positive relation between “company’s ownership” and company’s performance. Managerial ownership is 
negatively and significantly impacts on performance and about foreign ownership there is no any information 
indicating foreigners’ investment ownership within the companies under study.  
- Moein Aldin, Mahmud, and Fattaneh Dehghan (2012) in an article named “the impact of company’ 
governance structure on the quality of information reveal”, they have found out that there is a significant relation 
among ownership percentage of institutional investors and power concentration with final point of organizational 
reveal and its elements. While there is no any significant relation between managers who are not member of 
board of directors and final point of organizational reveal and its elements. 
- Khodadadi, Vali, and Reza Taker (2012) have studied the impact of company governance structure on 
financial performance and the value of companies listed in Tehran stock exchange. Results indicate that 
ownership concentration and governmental ownership are having positive and significant relation with 
performance and the value of companies. Major institutional investor is having positive relation with the value of 
company and has negative relation with the performance of company. Duality of CEO duty is having negative 
and significant relation with the value of company and it has no any significant relation with the performance of 
companies. Also company governance structure that includes all structural features mentioned in this study is 
having significant and positive relation with the value and performance of the company. 
- Zhara Hajiha and Hasanali Akhlaghi (2013) have studied the impact of board of director’s features on the 
structure of company’s debt payment date. Results indicate that there is a positive and significant relation 
between the size of board of directors and the structure of debt payment date. Also there is a negative and 
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significant relation between the percentage of other members of boards of directors and the structure of debt 
payment date.  
3. Research Methodology 
Present study is applicable in accordance with its purpose and it is considered as retrospective in terms of time 
dimension. Based upon the method of data collection, researches can be historical, descriptive, correlative, 
experimental or causal.  
3.1 Research Territory 
a) Time territory: the time length of the research is 5 years and it is started from the beginning of 2009 up to 
2013. 
b) Spatial territory: Tehran stock exchange 
- Society and research population: the population of this research includes all the companies listed in Tehran 
stock exchange, which were active from 2009 to 2013 and for sampling we have used random selection method 
and the size of sample is 88 companies. 
Data collection tools: we have used library method in order to collect data, in this regard, first we have used 
internet and information networks and observing books, magazine and theses in order to collect literature and 
research background history and achieving total structure of the research. Also, in order to collect required data 
for testing the hypotheses, the data of companies listed in Tehran stock exchange are extracted from Tadbir 
Pardaz software or official website of Tehran stock exchange. 
Analysis method: we have used multi-variant linear regression in order to test the hypotheses. Utilized statistical 
method in this research is the method of panel data. Also in order to review the significance of egression model, 
F statistic is utilized and also in order to review the significance of independent variables’ coefficient in each 
model we have used t statistic. At the end, in order to test hypotheses, first we shall test the merging correctness 
of data through test F and then the kind of test method shall be determined based on Hussman test (fixed or 
random effects) and regarding the kind of method we shall sum up the model. It is necessary to say that, in this 
study, in order to analyze data, we have utilized SPSS and Eviews software.  
4. Analysis of Results 
In this part, by using appropriate and clarified methods we will review and analyze these data in order to approve 
or reject hypotheses to find an appropriate answer for the questions of this research. Related abbreviations to 
research variables which are utilized in statistical tests are:  
 
Table 2. Research variables 
variables Defining variables 
PERFORMPerformance of the company 
CAP Number of Board of managing directors 
DUALITYManaging Director's duality 
DEP Adherence board of directors 
MSOWN Proportion of shares in the hands of members of board of directors on the total Company's shares 
ASSETS Company size 
BSIZE Number of Board of managing directors 
INST Proportion of shares in the hands of fundamental institutions on the total Company's shares 
RD/Sales development and cost expenses to total sales 
Debt/TA Financial leverage 
StdDevDOI(SD) Changes in operating profit 
Auditor Size of auditor 
DEBITDAChanges in profit before tax, interest, depreciation 
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4.1 Results of Descriptive Statistics 
Feature summary of descriptive statistics related to variables used in this study. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and independent variables 
 PERFORM INST MSOWN DEP CAP_MSWN CAP_DEP CAP_DULITY 
 mid -0.375118  79.05970  17.39123  0.596694  17.39123  0.596694  0.365909 
 mean -0.329556  82.33000  14.86500  0.600000  14.86500  0.600000  0.000000 
 max  0.631559  98.46000  96.67000  1.000000  96.67000  1.000000  1.000000 
Min -6.829594  3.330000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
The standard 
deviation  0.597988  16.42138  15.39157  0.191930  15.39157  0.191930  0.482232 
Skewness -5.290967 -1.459981  1.633789 -0.633598  1.633789 -0.633598  0.556759 
Stretchability  49.40735  6.285620  7.464371  4.184936  7.464371  4.184936  1.309980 
Quarter  41536.36  354.2271  561.1407  55.18073  561.1407  55.18073  75.09494 
Possibility  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
The number of 
observations  440  440  440  440  440  440  440 
 
Table 4. Pearson correlation test between variables 
  PERFORM DEP inst MSOWN ASSETS Std.dev RD.Saled Bsize DEBITDA
PERFORM Pearson Correlation 1 .068 .010 -.098* -.153** -.091 -.014 .062 -.106* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .155 .842 .040 .001 .058 .766 .194 .026 
DEP   Pearson Correlation .068 1 -.111* .048 -.038 -.064 -.008 .226** -.041 
Sig. (2-tailed) .155  .020 .312 .431 .183 .866 .000 .392 
inst Pearson Correlation .010 -.111* 1 -.720** .095* -.034 -.148** -.074 -.126** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .842 .020  .000 .046 .482 .002 .123 .008 
MSOWN  Pearson Correlation -.098* .048 -.720** 1 -.076 .077 .157** .105* .156** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .040 .312 .000  .111 .108 .001 .028 .001 
ASSETS Pearson Correlation -.153** -.038 .095* -.076 1 .551** -.148** .072 .548** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .431 .046 .111  .000 .002 .131 .000 
Std.dev.doi Pearson Correlation -.091 -.064 -.034 .077 .551** 1 -.034 .055 .638** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .058 .183 .482 .108 .000  .473 .247 .000 
RD.Saled Pearson Correlation -.014 -.008 -.148** .157** -.148** -.034 1 -.071 -.069 
Sig. (2-tailed) .766 .866 .002 .001 .002 .473  .135 .148 
Bsize Pearson Correlation .062 .226** -.074 .105* .072 .055 -.071 1 .059 
Sig. (2-tailed) .194 .000 .123 .028 .131 .247 .135  .220 
DEBITDA Pearson Correlation -.106* -.041 -.126** .156** .548** .638** -.069 .059 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .026 .392 .008 .001 .000 .000 .148 .220  
N 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 440 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
By taking a glance into the above table we see that the amounts of correlation among independent variables are 
very low. This note indicates the lack of existence of any kind of correlation among variables and it is an 
approval of one of fundamental conditions of regression. Therefore, totally, due to solve the mentioned problems 
we shall utilize the lowest GLSs in two models. 
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4.2 Hypothesis Testing 
If in test hypotheses: 
H0: There is no significant relationship between Managing Director duality and firm performance. 
H0: βi = 0 
H1: There is significant relationship between Managing Director duality and firm performance. 
H1: βi ≠ 0 
Hypothesis 1: there is a significant relation between CEO’s duality and company’s performance. 
 
Table 5. Results of significance of the first hypothesis 
 Description value df probability 
F-statistic test results Cross-section F 3.063100 (87,335) 0.0000 
Hausman test result Cross-section random 14.113478 17 0.6591 
 
Regarding that the obtained probability is less than 5%, therefore, we shall use the method of fixed effects in this 
model. 
 
Variable Coefficient sd T value  Prob. 
Type of 
Relationship 
The level of 
significance 
DUALITY 0.020937 0.005490 3.813646 0.0002 positive 99%  
MSOWN -0.000426 0.000709 -0.600408 0.5486 negative ----- 
ASSETS -0.122847 0.017557 -6.996960 0.0000 negative Is significant 
BSIZE -0.002779 0.019143 -0.145183 0.8847 negative ----- 
INST -0.000203 0.000384 -0.527252 0.5984 negative ----- 
RD_SALED 0.012988 0.070353 0.184608 0.8536 positive ----- 
DEBT_TA -2.057972 0.020742 -99.21691 0.0000 negative Is significant 
STD_DEV_DOI -5.76E-08 1.61E-08 -3.583164 0.0004 negative 99%  
AUDITOR -0.023703 0.010047 -2.359087 0.0189 negative 90%  
DEBITDA 1.27E-08 8.84E-09 1.440704 0.1506 positive ----- 
C 2.692800 0.268327 10.03553 0.0000 positive Is significant 
weighted statistics No weight statistics   
The coefficient of determination 0.992276 The coefficient of determination 0.693610   
 
Adjusted coefficient of determination 0.990085 Durbin-Watson statistic 2.058291 
  
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.438700     
F-statistic 452.9403     
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000      
       
 
Review of first hypothesis combinational model: 
As you see in above table, the amount of P-Value is 0.000000 and it indicates that the model is significant at 
level of 99%. Also the test of Watson-Camera of above relation is 1.5 to 2.5 which indicated the hypothesis is 
approved due to lack of self-correlation. The results of the test indicate that there is a positive and significant 
relation between CEO’s duality and company’s performance. controlling variables: size of company, financial 
leverage, deviation of operational profit changes and the size of auditor are having negative and significant 
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relation. The number of board of directors’ managers and the ratio of the shares in hand of institutional 
companies are having negative relation but insignificant, in comparison with the costs and development on total 
sales and changes in profit before deducting tax, interest and depreciation are having positive relation but it is not 
significant. the corrected determination coefficient indicates that approximately -99% of changes by the 
mentioned independent variables are explained in above table. 
Second hypothesis: there is a significant relation between board of directors’ adherence and company’s 
performance. 
 
 Description Amount of statisticsfd prob 
F-statistic test results Cross-section F 2.269656 (87,342) 0.0000 
Hausman test Cross-section random 128.258819 10 0.0000 
 
Regarding that the obtained probability is less than 5%, therefore, in this model we shall use the method of fixed 
effects. 
 
Table 6. Review of second hypothesis combinational model 
Variable Coefficient sd T value  Prob. 
Type of 
Relationship 
The level of
significance 
DEP 0.027438 0.022012 1.246477 0.2134 positive ----- 
MSOWN -0.000401 0.000809 -0.496094 0.6201 negative ----- 
ASSETS -0.120199 0.016544 -7.265413 0.0000 negative Is significant  
BSIZE 0.002089 0.017634 0.118478 0.9058 positive ----- 
INST -0.000182 0.000419 -0.435347 0.6636 يفنم ----- 
RD_SALED -0.015587 0.061097 -0.255111 0.7988 positive ----- 
DEBT_TA -2.053827 0.020297 -101.1886 0.0000 negative Is significant  
STD_DEV_DOI -3.75E-08 1.40E-08 -2.687554 0.0075 negative 95%  
AUDITOR -0.030021 0.009650 -3.110931 0.0020 negative 95%  
DEBITDA 5.55E-09 8.27E-09 0.670939 0.5027 positive ----- 
C 2.622121 0.253686 10.33608 0.0000 positive Is significant  
weighted statistics No weight statistics   
The coefficient of determination 0.993212 The coefficient of determination 0.693073   
 
Adjusted coefficient of determination 0.991286 Durbin-Watson statistic 2.063468 
  
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.356442     
F-statistic 515.8507     
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000      
 
As it is indicated in above table, the amount of P-Value is 0.000 and it indicates that the model is significant at 
level of 99%. Also the test of Watson-Camera of above relation is 1.5 to 2.5 which indicated the hypothesis is 
approved due to lack of self-correlation. The results of the test indicate that there is no any significant relation 
between board of directors’ adherence and company’s performance. Controlling variables: size of company, 
financial leverage, deviation of operational profit changes and the size of auditor are having negative and 
significant relation. The number of board of directors’ managers, ratio with the costs and development on total 
sales and changes in profit before deducting tax, interest and depreciation are having positive relation but it is not 
significant, the ratio of shares in hand of institutional company is having negative relation but insignificant. The 
corrected determination coefficient indicates that approximately -99.1% of changes by the mentioned 
independent variables are explained in above table. 
5. Conclusion 
Regarding many researches in field of board of directors structure and features in different companies in other 
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countries and also more significance towards variables inside the companies and the limited number of 
researches in Iran in this field, made the researcher to study the impact of board of directors’ structure and 
features on company’s performance in companies listed in Tehran stock exchange in present study. The results of 
testing this hypothesis and secondary hypotheses in companies existing in company are as follow: 
- The results of test indicate that there is a positive and significant relation between CEO’s duality and 
company’s performance. 
- There is no any significant relation between board of director’s adherence and company’s performance. 
The result of this research is matched with some of hypotheses of Chairmais and Ganni (2014) research. But it is 
not matched with Khodadadi, Vali, and Reza Taker (2012) research and Zohreh Hajiha and Hasan Ali Akhlaghi 
(2013) studies. 
6. Recommendation 
- Recommendations based on the results of the first hypothesis: 
It is recommended to investors, analysts and other individuals to consider more the financial statements, notes on 
cash flows, and also reports relating to announcing the changes in monthly, seasonal profits and its prediction by 
board of directors and the report of board of directors activities, the ownership of management during a year and 
the probability of its increase or decrease. 
- Recommendations based on the results of the second hypothesis: 
It is recommended to investors and shareholders to focus more on detailed reports about reports and productive 
and operational activities of company. Also it is recommended to analysts to focus more on the formation of 
board of directors. Also stock organization can push the organizations in order to reveal their seasonal and 
detailed reports from the results of this research for each one of relating reports to the activities of board of 
directors in order to decrease the problem of companies’ ownership concentration and also to utilize it in order to 
improve the quality of financial reports level. 
6.1 Recommendations for Future Research 
1). Investigate the effect of board of directors structure and  its characteristics on teh performance of leasing 
companies, and investment holding company listed on Tehran Stock Exchange 
2). Study of factors affecting board of directors structure and  its characteristics in Large companies listed on 
the exchanges Persian Gulf Countries 
3). Examine the relationship between the characteristics of board of directors and earnings management behavior 
through accruals and items located in the stock market and OTC companies. 
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